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Reply 
William Ewald 
I found much to agree with in Professor West's article; the differences 
between us are less great than he supposes. He condemns CLS for its 
"theoretical mediocrity" and for its "thoroughly negative attitude towards 
liberalism." He accuses it of playing "childish games" and of leading to 
"shallow dilettantism." He observes that Unger's work is "overrated by 
some CLS people" and that "for the less disciplined ones, his texts serve 
as a substitute for homework." He dismisses Unger's most influential 
work as "an old decrepit doghouse." These words are somewhat harsh, 
but I am sympathetic to their spirit. 
The rest of his piece I found less persuasive. I regret in particular that 
he has misunderstood the point of my article. 
My article was not about politics, nor, except in passing, was it about 
CLS. It was about Unger and his contributions to philosophy. According 
to West, "Unger stands at the intersection of the Jefferson-Emerson­
Dewey insights and the Rousseau-Marx-Gramsci formulations," and his 
work "is, by far, the most significant attempt to articulate a Third-Wave 
Left romanticism."1 In light of the importance attached to Unger's philo­
sophical work in comments like these, I thought that it would be illumi­
nating to examine his theories. 
My methodology was straightforward. I looked at Unger's most influ­
ential writings and discussed his central arguments and his principal 
scholarly assertions. West raises several objections to my analysis: 
1. Choice of Texts. West accuses me of spending too much time on 
Knowledge and Politics. He says it was "abandoned by Unger long ago," 
and that Unger has engaged in extensive self-criticism of his earlier work. 
I am agog to see the evidence, but West provides no citation. Nor does he 
appear to notice that I explain, in the opening and closing paragraphs, 
why Knowledge and Politics remains worthy of discussion. Knowledge 
and Politics is Unger's most influential book. It is also his best book. His 
admirers agree that his subsequent contributions to legal theory build 
upon it.2 And I explained, in my discussion of his CLS article, how Un­
ger's arguments against "formalism" and "objectivism" repeat the mis­
takes of his earlier work. 
I. West, Between Dewey and Gramsci: Unger's Emancipatory Experimentalism, 81 Nw. U.L. 
REv. 941 (1987). 
2. Their words are quoted in my Article at note 3. 
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Unger has indeed changed his terminology. He no longer speaks of "or­
ganic groups." Instead, he speaks of "superliberalism" and the "disen­
trenchment of formative structures" and "empowerment." But I criticize 
all of these theories. Unger's visionary writings do not rely upon one an­
other, but they all suffer from the same flaw-namely, wild implausibil­
ity. His early theory of "organic groups," for all its shortcomings, is a 
more plausible blueprint for political action than his recent theory of "cul­
tural revolution." Unger has in fact built a string of doghouses, and my 
article shows that his workmanship has gotten worse with the years. 
2. Choice of Standards. My standards of criticism are straightforward 
and utterly banal. Unger pins his refutation of LIBERALISM on a peculiar 
reading of Aristotle, Hume, and Quine; I pointed out that his learned 
footnotes bear no resemblance to what those thinkers actually say. Unger 
attempts to knock down a vague, timeless, ahistorical set of six self­
contradictory principles that nobody ever held; I pointed out that this 
strategy is inadequate to refute what he calls "the dominant and central 
element in modern thought." Unger is eager to display his knowledge of 
mathematics and logic; I pointed out that he gets into a twist every time. 
Unger declares his admiration for the Chinese Cultural Revolution; I 
pointed out that he forgets to mention the unpleasant historical facts. 
West does not attempt to dispute these criticisms. Instead, he declares 
that the criteria of historical accuracy and sound argument are "being 
contested on a deeper intellectual and institutional level," and claims that 
I invoke them "as if they are context-free, universal standards untainted 
by ideological prejudgments and outside of power-struggles and political 
conflict." This seems a desperate line of reasoning; it is no better than the 
argument that you cannot violate the rules of poker because then you 
must be playing not-poker. 
3. Liberalism. West's remarks on the "open texture" of liberalism seem 
to me entirely apt, and I accept them without reservation. But he confuses 
me with Unger. Unger is the one who thinks liberalism is "a single mode 
of thought"3 that can be summed up in six abstract principles. I am the 
one who thinks it is vague and open-textured. 
4. Reading Unger. West chides me for not engaging "in a detailed 
reading of Unger's later philosophy," and promises to give us "a more 
useful reading" of Unger's texts. That would be an instructive project, but 
the rest of West's article is about CLS, not about Unger. In a footnote, he 
offers his recent article on Politics as an example of a better kind of Un­
ger scholarship. Readers who consult it will, I fear, be disappointed." 
3. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITICS 3 (1975) (quoted in my Article at note 39). 
4. The central thesis of West's article is that "Roberto Unger's distinctive contribution to contem­
porary social thought is to radically deepen and sharpen John Dewey's notion of social experimenta­
tion in the light of the crisis of Marxist theory and praxis." West, supra note 1, at 941. West's thesis 
is handicapped by the fact that, although the index to Politics contains references to most of the 
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5. Unge1·'s Popularity. I quoted several of Unger's followers who com­
pare him to Niarx, Durkheim, Weber, Spinoza, Dante, and Virgil. I had 
naively assumed that Unger was being compared to these thinkers because 
of his intellectual and scholarly accomplishments. West offers a different 
theory: Unger's followers praise him because of his exciting political 
stance and because they find law school "boring, tedious, and irrelevant." 
This may well be so. But Unger has an obligation to the world of scholar­
ship as well as to the world of revolutionary struggle. I was concerned to 
point out that his scholarly obligations have not been met. 
thinkers and political events of world history, it does not once mention Dewey. Moreover, as West 
himself rightly notes, Unger's one passing comment on Dewey makes three factual mistakes. Rather 
than reconsidering his thesis, West makes this curious argument: "I do believe Unger has simply 
slipped in his brief mention of Dewey. Yet this slippage is significant because Dewey could provide 
Unger with some enabling insights and tools for his project." !d. at 948. West makes no attempt to 
explain how Unger could be "building upon" the work of a thinker he scarcely mentions. Instead, he 
spends most of his article on Dewey and Gramsci. Although West admonishes us that Unger's new 
work ought to be read with "close attention and scrutiny," id. at 951, he does not seem particularly 
interested in a scholarly reading of Unger's text: All of his footnotes are to the first and slenderest of 
the three volumes of Politics, and (with one exception) they are all to the opening pages and to the 
conclusion. 
Incidentally, West finds it "shocking" that, having once footnoted Professor Boyle's review of Pas­
sion, I did not also quote another passage by the same author. But that passage occurs in a different 
journal; it deals with another subject; and I am unable to see its relevance to anything in my article. 
